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Abstract
If an emission reduction agreement with participation of all players
is not enforceable because politicians are too myopic or not able to
commit themselves to sustainable policies or costs of reducing emis-
sions are too high, strategic investments in research and development
(R&D) of green technology, for example sustainable drive-trains, can
pave the way for a future treaty. Although no player will rationally
reduce emissions on its own, investments in R&D by at least one player
can change the strategic situation of negotiations to control emissions:
Emission abatement costs will decrease so that a treaty with full par-
ticipation can be achieved in future periods through time consistent
sustainable policies.
Keywords: emissions; discount factor; commitment; endogenous
technical change; repeated prisoner’s dilemma
JEL: Q54; F53; O30; H41
1 Introduction
International cooperation to reduce environmental external eﬀects, for ex-
ample cross border emissions, often fails. Because no country has to partic-
ipate and all countries can renegotiate their treaties at any times, especially
if governments change due to regular elections, institutions that sustain
international cooperation have to be both individually and collectively ra-
tional. Therefore, collective action through agreements to reduce cross bor-
der emissions has to be and has been analyzed by several game-theoretical
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contributions using dynamic models of international public goods provision
(Carraro/Siniscalco 1993). Barrett (1999) uses a repeated N -player pris-
oner’s dilemma game where each country can choose between participating
on a global agreement, inducing the reduction of emissions, and rejecting the
agreement. Because a deviating country is punished by all other countries,
the number of participating countries has to be small if an agreement shall be
enforced. However, if only a subset of countries participates in an agreement
the environmental benefit of the agreement is at risk. Consider, for example,
a single country reducing greenhouse gas emissions. If the world supply of
fossil fuels remains fixed, a reduction in the demand for fossil fuels would
merely lower the world price of carbon and provoke non-participating coun-
tries to consume what the participating countries have saved (Sinn 2008).
The so-called “green paradox” sows seeds of doubt about the benefit of
partial agreements.
Barrett (2002) demonstrates that many countries can participate in an
agreement, but only if the abatement level of emission is lowered. To summa-
rize, the approaches of Barrett (1999 and 2002) expose a trade-oﬀ between
“narrow but deep” and “broad but shallow” treaties; however, society strives
for “broad and deep”.
Asheim et al. (2006) demonstrate that two treaties can encompass a
larger number of parties than a single global treaty proposed by Barrett
(1999), because under regional cooperation a deviator is punished by just
a group of countries. Then the system with two agreements can Pareto
dominate a regime based on one global treaty, meaning that the global
reduction of emissions is greater under two agreements than under one single
agreement. Nonetheless, even with two regional agreements, the number of
participating countries is limited, leading again to the problem of the green
paradox.
Froyn and Hovi (2008) oﬀer a more optimistic view. They show that it
may be possible to sustain full participation in one single agreement without
watering down abatement levels. This can be achieved by limiting the num-
ber of countries that are permitted to punish a non-compliant country which
has deviated from the agreement. Froyn and Hovi’s (2008) findings can also
be transferred to a model where countries can choose the level of abatement
in every period, as Asheim and Holtsmark (2009) demonstrate. They show
that a “broad and deep” agreement with full participation and abatement at
an eﬃcient level can always be achieved if the countries’ common discount
factor is suﬃciently high.
However, as the experiences from Copenhagen show, global agreements
about emission reduction currently seem to be not available. One reason may
be that politicians place a high weight on present payoﬀs, but too less weight
on payoﬀs in future legislative periods. Furthermore, abatement of emissions
may be too expensive. In this paper, we will demonstrate a solution for this
dilemma. If negotiations about the provision of an international public good
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like emission reduction fail because politicians are too myopic or abatement
costs are too high, then investments in research and development (R&D)
can pave the way for a future treaty. We will show that just one country
can do the pioneer work to invest in green technology, so that emissions will
eﬀectively be slowed down. The investing country will not reduce emissions
on its own, but will remove the debilitating strategic situation of emission
reduction negotiations by bringing forward green technology. The improved
technology will lead to a decrease of abatement costs. As soon as abatement
costs are suﬃciently reduced, there will be a future agreement with full
participation.
2 The model
We consider a world consisting of N identical countries. In every period of
the infinitely repeated game, each country has to decide whether to cooper-
ate, i.e., to reduce emissions at cost c > 0, or to defect, i.e., not to reduce
emissions. The mitigation of emissions is not limited to national borders,
but is a global public good from which all countries can equally benefit. Let
k ≤ N be the number of countries that participate in an agreement. Then,
the periodic payoﬀ for each of the k participating countries playing cooper-
ate is dk−c, where d > 0 is a constant. Each of the N −k non-participating
countries playing defect receives dk. Future payoﬀs are discounted with a
common discount factor 0 < δ < 1.
In the stage game, the provision of the global public good results in
a prisoner’s dilemma. No country will sign the agreement, because defect
is a dominant strategy, d(k − 1) > dk − c ∀k. This condition must also
hold for the case of k = 1, therefore c > d holds. It follows then that full
participation cannot be a Nash equilibrium, because the assumption implies
that d(N − 1) > dN − c for k = N . Furthermore, the outcome of the stage
game is not Pareto eﬃcient: Full participation will Pareto dominate zero
participation, dN − c > 0. It follows that the number of countries must
be suﬃciently large, i.e., N > c/d > 1. This condition is assumed to be
fulfilled.
3 A global agreement with immediate abatement
Following Froyn and Hovi (2008), a global agreement with full participation,
i.e., k = N , can be accomplished by a strategy called Penance-m. Penance-
m is characterized by three actions. First, each participating country plays
cooperate as long as all other participating countries play cooperate as well.
Second, if one country plays defect, m countries will punish the deviator by
playing defect in the following period while the other k −m countries will
play cooperate. Third, if one of the m punishing countries deviates from
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playing defect in a period of punishment, it will be punished as well by m
punishing countries playing defect in the following period. Countries are
quick to forgive, therefore, the punishment lasts for one period only.
Penance-m must fulfill two conditions of equilibrium: subgame perfec-
tion and renegotiation-proofness. In the following, these two conditions are
briefly introduced. However, see Froyn and Hovi (2008) for a more detailed
discussion. Subgame perfection at time t is satisfied if no country has an
incentive to deviate from Penance-m given any history, i.e., if every country
abides by Penance-m after the previous periods τ = ..., t − 2, t − 1. For a
country playing cooperate, Penance-m is subgame perfect if
∞￿
τ=t
δτ (dN − c) ≥ δtd(N −1)+ δt+1(d(N −m)− c)+
∞￿
τ=t+2
δτ (dN − c) (1)
holds. For one of the m punishing countries playing defect, the condition of
subgame perfection applies if
δtd(N −m) +
∞￿
τ=t+1
δτ (dN − c) ≥
δt(d(N −m+ 1)− c) + δt+1(d(N −m)− c) +
∞￿
τ=t+2
δτ (dN − c).
(2)
This condition holds for all k and for all δ because d(N−m) > d(N−m+1)−c
and dN − c > d(N −m)− c. Furthermore, subgame perfection requires that
in a period of punishment all N−m non-punishing countries play cooperate,
δt(d(N −m)− c) +
∞￿
τ=t+1
δτ (dN − c) ≥
δtd(N −m− 1) + δt+1(d(N −m)− c) +
∞￿
τ=t+2
δτ (dN − c).
(3)
If condition (3) holds, (1) is satisfied as well. Solving (3) for the number of
punishing countries results in a lower bound for m,
m ≥ m = c− d
δd
. (4)
The second requirement is that the strategy profile must be renegotiation-
proof. Froyn and Hovi (2008) adopt weak renegotiation-proofness, which
implies that the m punishing countries gain at least the same payoﬀ with
punishment as with renegotiation,
∞￿
τ=t
δτ (dN − c) ≤ δtd(N −m) +
∞￿
τ=t+1
δτ (dN − c). (5)
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Renegotiation-proofness yields an upper bound for the number of punishing
countries,
m ≤ m¯ = c
d
. (6)
However, these conditions are not suﬃcient for an equilibrium. According to
the Folk Theorem, all participating countries must attach suﬃciently great
importance to future payoﬀs.
Proposition 1. Penance-m leads to a subgame perfect and weakly renego-
tiation-proof equilibrium if
c− d
δd
≤ m ≤ c
d
(7)
and if the weight that countries place on future payoﬀs is suﬃciently high:
δ ≥ δ˜ = 1− d
c
. (8)
Proof. The lower boundm for the number of punishing countries follows
from the subgame perfection requirement. There always exists a lower bound
m > 0 because, according to our assumption, c > d holds. The upper bound
m¯ for the number of punishing countries results from the weak renegotiation-
proofness requirement and is always lower than the number of participating
countries N because, by assumption, dN − c > 0, and hence N > c/d.
For an equilibrium m ≤ m¯ must hold. The upper bound m¯ is indepen-
dent of the discount factor. By contrast, the lower bound m decreases with
an increasing discount factor δ. Therefore, the condition m ≤ m¯ will only
hold for discount factors that are high enough, i.e.,
δ ≥ δ˜ = 1− d
c
. (9)
Because c > d > 0, it follows that 0 < d/c < 1, and therefore 0 < δ˜ < 1.
Obviously, a global agreement with participation of all countries can only
be achieved if abatement costs are not too high or/and the weight placed
on future payoﬀs by the countries is not too low.
Aiming for re-election, politicians prefer local or national policy measures
that cause immediate benefits to their voters, formalized through a low δ.
To summarize condition (8), high emission abatement costs or myopia of
politicians may foreclose a global agreement.
We oﬀer a solution for this dilemma. In the next section, we show
that a global agreement with full participation can be concluded if technical
change lowers abatement costs over time. Hence, such an agreement may
be achieved at a later date – as soon as the costs of reducing emissions have
suﬃciently declined.
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4 A global agreement with future abatement
As from now, abatement costs ct shall depend on the level of green tech-
nology yt. The available technology is related to technical knowledge. The
technology can be improved by investments in R&D, which will lead to a
reduction in abatement costs. For example, the internal combustion engine,
that creates large polluting emissions, is the drive-train used in almost all
cars. As an alternative there are green technologies available, for example
electric powered mobility. However, the user costs of sustainable drive-trains
are still higher than the costs of the traditional internal combustion technol-
ogy. Investments in R&D of sustainable drive-train technology can improve
the cost eﬃciency of low-emission drive-trains and therefore reduce abate-
ment costs of automobile traﬃc.
We consider the case in which no emission reduction agreement would
be signed today, i.e., in which condition (8) is not satisfied. Abatement
of emissions may either be too expensive in period t = 0, or politicians
may be too myopic. In both cases, the crucial discount factor concerning
the emission reduction contract exceeds the common discount factor of all
countries,
δ < δ˜(t = 0) = 1− d/c0. (10)
However, a global emission reduction agreement can be achieved in fu-
ture periods, if one country does the pioneer work and invests in R&D. It is
assumed that the investing country provides funds in the amount of It for
R&D in the period t. For the purpose of simplification, the level of technol-
ogy increases by a constant fraction 0 < α < 1 of investments It, where α
reflects the eﬃciency of R&D with which the technology is improved. Be-
cause research is a timely process, the technological progress is bounded by
yˆ, which is the maximum technological progress obtainable in one period
of time. Then, I = yˆ/α is the level up to which investments in R&D are
eﬃcient. The increase in the technology level is thus given by
∆yt = yt+1 − yt = min{αIt, yˆ}. (11)
Provided that investment is eﬃcient, i.e. It ≤ I for all t, the level of tech-
nology in period t equals
yt = y0 + α
t−1￿
τ=0
Iτ with y0 = 1. (12)
It follows that a country has to invest I in each period to improve the
technology as fast as possible. The improved technology leads to a decrease
in abatement costs,
ct =
c0 − d
yt
+ d. (13)
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It is impossible to remove the prisoners dilemma of the stages by investment
in technology, because ct > d applies in each future period. Defection, i.e.,
not participating in the emission reduction agreement, remains the dominant
strategy in each of the stages. But even though investments in R&D are not
a strategy to change the stage game, they may induce the countries to join
the agreement in future periods. However, this requires one single country
that leads the way.
Proposition 2. For all δ, I, N and α there exists a finite t˜, such that the
following strategies are an equilibrium, if the initial level of abatement costs
is not too high: Exactly one country invests
I0 =
(1− δ)c0 − d
αδd
− (t˜− 1)I (14)
in period t = 0 and It = I from period t = 1 to t = t˜− 1, and all countries
sign a global emission reduction treaty in t˜ that is based on Penance-m.
Proof. The pioneer aims to obtain the payoﬀs arising from the emis-
sion reduction agreement as soon as possible. Therefore, it will invest the
maximum level I of investments, but stops investing as soon as the “break-
through” technology level is reached, i.e., when condition (8) is satisfied.
The “breakthrough” level shall be reached in t = t˜, so that an emission
reduction agreement will come into eﬀect in the same period. If the “break-
through” technology would be exceeded in t˜, the pioneer would only invest
the residual investment in one period. Due to discounting, the residual in-
vestment is made in period t = 0. Hence, the resulting technology at t = t˜
equals
yt˜ = 1 + α(I0 + (t˜− 1)I). (15)
According to (8), there will be a global emission reduction agreement at
t = t˜, if abatement costs fulfill
ct˜ =
c0 − d
1 + α(I0 + (t˜− 1)I) + d =
d
1− δ . (16)
The residual investment I0 thus equals
I0 =
(1− δ)c0 − d
αδd
− (t˜− 1)I. (17)
Because I0/I ≤ 1, the “breakthrough” technology is reached at
t˜ =
￿
(1− δ)c0 − d
αδdI
￿
. (18)
where the brackets symbolize the ceiling function, which refers to the next
largest natural number. At this point of time, condition (8) will be fulfilled,
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so that every country would sign a global emission reduction agreement
based on Penance-m.
But the pioneer must have an incentive to invest: its investment strategy
is optimal if
t˜−1￿
τ=0
δτIτ ≤
∞￿
τ=t˜
δτ (dN − d
1− δ ), (19)
i.e., if the present value of investments, which are optimally terminated at
t˜−1, is at most the present value of payoﬀs from the induced global emission
reduction agreement. Then, the point in time at which an agreement is
reached is limited by an upper bound,
t˜ ≤
ln((1− δ)I0 + δI)− ln(dN − d(1−δ) + I)
ln δ
. (20)
Consequently, the eﬀective date of the treaty must fulfill￿
(1− δ)c0 − d
αδdI
￿
≤
ln((1− δ)I0 + δI)− ln(dN − d(1−δ) + I)
ln δ
. (21)
This is the case, if c0 ≤ cˆ0 with
cˆ0 =
￿
ln((1− δ)I0 + δI)− ln(dN − d(1−δ) + I)
ln δ
￿
· αδdI
1− δ +
d
1− δ , (22)
where the brackets symbolize the floor function, which refers to the next
smallest natural number. Consequently, there is a global emission reduction
agreement, if the initial level of abatement costs is not too high, as stated
in the proposition.
There exists always a t˜ ≥ 1, because (1−δ)c0−d > 0 holds by assumption
(10), and therefore￿
(1− δ)c0 − d
αδdI
￿
≥ 1 (23)
is satisfied. The upper bound for the initial level of abatement costs fulfills
the assumption that cˆ0 > d/(1 − δ), because I0 ≤ I, (1 − δ)c0 − d > 0,
dN − c0 > 0 and therefore ln((1− δ)I0 + δI) < ln(dN − d/(1− δ) + I).
In period t˜, the “breakthrough” technology leads to a crucial discount
factor δ˜ that equals exactly the common discount factor of all countries,
so that Penance-m becomes an applicable strategy for a global emission re-
duction agreement for the first time. All countries will sign the treaty in
this period. The payoﬀ for a cooperating country, provided that all other
countries play cooperate as well, equals dN−d/(1−δ) for this and every fol-
lowing period. It is individually and collectively rational to play cooperate,
because a deviating country would be punished on the basis of Penance-m.
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5 Concluding Remarks
This paper oﬀers a road map to limit cross border emissions eﬀectively. Our
analysis shows that strategic investments in R&D of green technology can
pave the way for a future global agreement with the participation of all
countries. These investments are no solution to the common good problem
of emission reduction, but might change the strategic situation of environ-
mental agreements. Although no country will rationally lead the way by
reducing emissions on its own, one country can rationally lead the way by
strategically investing in R&D, thereby enabling a global agreement with
full participation.
While our model supports public investments in R&D, it does not sup-
port the popular claim that such policy results in future jobs or monopoly
rents based on patents. For the conclusion of a global agreement with full
participation, the newly developed green technology must be made available
to all countries free of cost, at least during the agreement. Therefore, the
pioneer that has developed the technology, cannot earn monopoly rents af-
ter t˜. New jobs may merely be created in R&D, but not necessarily in the
production and distribution of the “breakthrough” technology afterwards.
A thorough analysis of the investment strategy shows that the investment
in R&D is a chicken game between all countries. While it is optimal to
invest if no other country invests, the payoﬀs are higher if another country
bears the investment costs for the technology. However, one can imagine
strategies where some countries share the burden. For example, in order to
improve research eﬃciency and reduce development costs, the development
of the new green technology could be accomplished by a cooperation of
governments sharing the vision of a mankind of homo sustinens and/or of
the countries who share green preferences and prefer sustainable economic
activities.
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